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1. Materially, military necessity evaluates the cogency between the means taken or considered vis-à-
vis the ends sought under the circumstances prevailing or anticipated at the time. The military ne-
cessity of a particular course of action is in part a function of the availability of alternative courses 
of action, military ends and sets of circumstances. 
 
2. Within the context of international humanitarian law (IHL) norm-creation, military necessity de-
notes normative indifference. The mere fact that an act is lacking in military necessity does not 
make it illegitimate for that reason alone; nor does an act’s military necessity per se mean that it 
ought to be performed. Rather, each belligerent remains at liberty not only to pursue military ne-
cessities and avoid non-necessities, but also to forgo necessities and encumber itself with non-
necessities. IHL framers therefore have no reason to prohibit acts deemed militarily unnecessary, 
or to obligate those deemed militarily necessary. 
 
3. Juridically, military necessity functions exclusively as an exception. It exempts a measure from 
positive IHL rules that principally prescribe contrary action, to the extent that the measure is re-
quired for the attainment of a military purpose and otherwise in conformity with that law. If not, 
or no longer, militarily necessary, the measure ceases to be exempted, reverts to the principal rule, 
and becomes unlawful. 
 
4. Several property- and displacement-related war crimes and crimes against humanity are derived 
from substantive IHL rules to which military necessity clauses are attached. Each of these crimes 
contains an element that the act must have been committed without military necessity. Military 
necessity pleas are inadmissible vis-à-vis the other crimes. Article 31 of the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court that excludes individual criminal responsibility for acts in defence of 
property “essential for accomplishing a military mission” and envisions other exclusionary 
grounds is somewhat of a concern. 
 
5. Some belligerent acts are both humane and militarily necessary, or both inhumane and militarily 
unnecessary. There are situations where humanity demands what military necessity permits, and 
where humanity condemns what military necessity merely tolerates. IHL framers account for 
many of these situations when they posit unqualified obligations to act in a manner that jointly 
satisfies military necessity and humanity. Third considerations, especially sovereign interests, limit 
the number of positive IHL rules that contain such obligations. 
 
6. Where humanity condemns what military necessity permits, or where humanity demands what 
military necessity merely tolerates, the belligerent experiences a norm contradiction. Since military 
necessity is always normatively indifferent, it is still always open to the belligerent to act in a joint-
ly satisfactory manner by behaving as directed by humanity. IHL framers account for this when 
they posit obligations to pursue joint satisfaction unqualifiedly, principally, indeterminately or ex-
ceptionally, or when they decline or fail to posit such rules. 
 
7. Indifferent considerations do not survive IHL norm-creation that posits rules unqualifiedly obli-
gating contrary action. Such rules extinguish all contrary liberties, whether emanating from indif-
ferent considerations of military necessity, humanity, or chivalry. The notion that acting as per-
mitted by such considerations “rights” or “repairs” its IHL breach is therefore untenable. Con-
versely, where positive IHL rules unqualifiedly authorise conduct, they override all indifferent 
considerations to the contrary. This invalidates the idea that an act’s lack of military necessity, 
humanity or chivalry purportedly “wrongs” or “vitiates” its compliance with positive IHL rules. 
 
8. It is not inconceivable that IHL norm-creation leaves genuine conflicts between positive IHL 
rules and non-indifferent demands and condemnations unresolved. In that case, the latter may 
operate as an additional layer of lawfulness determination over and above the former. Where 
humanity or chivalry condemns what positive IHL rules unqualifiedly obligate, or where humani-
ty or chivalry demands what the rules unqualifiedly prohibit, the belligerent may be justified in 
choosing humanitarian or chivalrous imperatives. 
 
 
